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FIXING SECTION 409A: LEGISLATIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE OPTIONS
GREGG D. POLSKY*
IN 2004, in response to perceived deferred compensation abuses by En-
ron executives,' Congress enacted section 409A.2 Section 409A imposes
a significant tax penalty on deferred compensation arrangements that do
not meet its numerous technical requirements. 3 Thus, the effect of Sec-
tion 409A is strict federal regulation of deferred compensation arrange-
ments. This Article argues that the strict regulation of deferred
compensation under section 409A is an unqualified mistake and presents
various options for improvement.
While some deferred compensation arrangements generate substan-
tial tax benefits as compared to analogous current compensation, others
are not tax-advantaged. 4 Section 409A still allows tax-advantaged deferred
compensation arrangements to generate their tax benefits; it simply re-
quires that the plans satisfy its, technical requirements.5 Thus, section
* Gregg D. Polsky is a Willie Person Mangum Professor at University of North
Carolina School of Law. Thanks to Alfred Brophy, John Coyle, Brant Hellwig, and
Steven Sholk for their comments; all errors are mine.
1. See Dana L. Trier, Rethinking the Taxation of Nonqualified Deferred Compensa-
tion: Code Sec. 409A, the Hedging Regulations and Code Sec. 1032, TAXES, Mar. 2006, at
141, 165 (noting that section 409A was stimulated by Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion's Report on Enron).
2. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885, 118
Stat. 1418 (codified at I.R.C. § 409A (2012)).
3. See id. Technically, section 409A imposes the penalty on noncompliant
nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. See I.R.C. § 409A(d) (1) (A) (ex-
empting qualified plans). Qualified deferred compensation arrangements, such as
401k plans, provide an explicit tax subsidy in exchange for satisfying a number of
technical conditions. An important condition is that the plans must not discrimi-
nate in favor of highly compensated employees. In addition, the amount of com-
pensation that can be deferred under qualified plans is substantially limited.
Nonqualified plans, on the other hand, do not receive an explicit tax subsidy
(though, as discussed below, they still may be tax-advantaged), can (and usually
do) discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees, and are not subject to
limitations as to amounts that can be deferred. Because section 409A applies only
to nonqualified plans, when this Article uses the term "deferred compensation," it
means only nonqualified deferred compensation.
4. See Gregg D. Polsky & BrantJ. Hellwig, Taxing the Promise to Pay, 89 MINN. L.
REv. 1092, 1142-44 (2005) (providing example where, because of equivalent tax
rates for employer and employee, deferred compensation and current compensa-
tion are taxed identically); Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of
Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. Rv. 571, 579 n.23 (2007) (noting that, if em-
ployer's investment income tax rate is higher than employee's investment income
tax rate, deferred compensation will be tax disadvantageous).
5. See Eric D. Chason, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing the Fruit of the Tree in
its Proper Season, 67 OHio ST. L.J. 347, 349 (2006) ("Perhaps at the margin, fewer
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409A does not remove the tax advantage of deferred compensation in the
vast majority of cases. Furthermore, section 409A applies to even those
deferred compensation arrangements that are not tax-advantaged; in
those cases, section 409A merely adds significant compliance costs without
any corresponding benefit to the tax system. In addition, section 409A's
scope is extremely wide, capturing a large number of non-tax-motivated
arrangements that many people would not characterize as deferred com-
pensation, which results in a trap for the unwary or unsophisticated. Fi-
nally, section 409A's requirements are extremely intricate and complex.
The intricacy means that taxpayers lose the flexibility to structure deferred
compensation arrangements that best meet their legitimate business
objectives, while the complexity means that even careful, well-advised tax-
payers may commit costly technical violations.
In short, section 409A does not even come close to solving the tax
problems associated with deferred compensation. At the same time, it
tightly regulates all deferred compensation plans, an extremely large and
varied group of contractual arrangements, resulting in large costs with
very little corresponding benefit to the tax system. Section 409A is a
failure.
This Article discusses the section 409A failure and explores the vari-
ous options that Congress and the tax administrators have for dealing with
it. Part I describes the concept of deferred compensation, the pre-section
409A taxation of deferred compensation, the potential tax benefits of de-
ferred compensation, and the impetuses for Congress's enactment of sec-
tion 409A. Part II summarizes section 409A's provisions, while Part III
catalogues its problems. Part IV discusses the options for reforming sec-
tion 409A. Part V concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Taxation of Deferred Compensation
In tax parlance, deferred compensation generally refers to compensa-
tion that is received and taxed after the services giving rise to the right to
compensation have been performed. For instance, an employer might
agree to pay an employee $100,000 in ten years for work performed this
year. In that case, the employee, despite earning the right to income this
year, would receive and be taxed on the compensation in Year Ten.
To achieve deferral of taxation, taxpayers historically had to success-
fully navigate around the tax doctrines of constructive receipt and eco-
nomic benefit.6 If they did, then the following tax consequences generally
executives and corporations will bother passing through § 409A's gates. For those
who make it through, the economics are unchanged."); Trier, supra note 1, at 165
(noting that section 409A left intact traditional nonqualified deferred compensa-
tion regime).
6. See PAUL R. McDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 1078-80 (6th ed.
2008). Another doctrine, the cash equivalence doctrine, is also relevant, though it
[Vol. 57: p. 635636
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would result: (1) the service provider would not realize gross income until
she received cash, (2) during the deferral period, the service recipient
would include in gross income the investment yield on amounts set aside
to pay the deferred compensation, and (3) upon payment of the deferred
compensation, the service recipient would take a deduction in the amount
of the payment.7 In contrast, if current compensation were paid (or if
either of the tax doctrines were triggered), then (1) the service provider
would realize immediate gross income in an amount equal to the present
value of the payment rights, (2) during the deferral period, the service
provider would include in gross income the investment yield on this pre-
sent value,8 and (3) the service recipient would receive an immediate de-
duction equal to the present value of the payment rights. These results
are summarized in the table below.
IMMEDIATE TAX TAX
CONSEQUENCES TAXATION OF CONSEQUENCES
UPON EARNING INVESTMENT UPON PAYMENT
OF DEFERRED YIELD DURING OF THE DEFERRED
COMPENSATION DEFERRAL PERIOD COMPENSATION
DEFERRED No tax Service recipient Service provider
TAXATION consequences to taxed on the taxed on the
either party investment yield payment; service
recipient receives
corresponding
deduction
CURRENT Service provider Service provider No tax
TAXATION taxed on the fair taxed on the consequences to
market value of investment yield either party
the
compensation;
service recipient
receives
corresponding
deduction
is much more narrow, and therefore much less significant, than the other two. For
discussion of the cash equivalence doctrine, see Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 4, at
1113-15.
7. See McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 6, at 1077.
8. Note that the investment yield would be taxed when it is realized under the
service provider's method of accounting; likewise the service recipient would be
taxed on the investment yield when it is realized under the service recipient's
method of accounting if the arrangement satisfied the requirements for deferred
taxation. Thus, if the deferred compensation were invested in stock that later ap-
preciates, the investment yield (i.e., gain) would generally be taxed only when the
stock is sold.
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B. Constructive Receipt and Economic Benefit
To achieve the desired treatment, deferred compensation has to
avoid current taxation under the doctrines of constructive receipt and eco-
nomic benefit.9 The constructive receipt doctrine provides that taxpayers
are deemed to be in receipt of an item of income before they actually
receive the item. The constructive receipt doctrine applies when an item
of income is made available to the taxpayer without substantial restriction
or limitation. 10 To avoid implicating the constructive receipt doctrine, de-
ferred compensation plans generally require that any decision to defer
income be made before the related services are performed, and the deci-
sion must be irrevocable. Thus, an election to irrevocably defer $100,000
of Year Two salary (for example, until Year Ten") would typically have to
be made in Year One. While an expansive application of the constructive
receipt doctrine might have captured such a deferral election, the IRS has
blessed timely initial deferral elections.1 2
To avoid the economic benefit doctrine, rights to future payment
must be "unfunded."' 3 This means that the service provider must remain
in the position of a general unsecured creditor. Any attempt to secure the
promise or otherwise insulate the service provider from the risk of the
service recipient's insolvency triggers the economic benefit doctrine, re-
sulting in current taxation of the rights to future payment.
The classic economic benefit situation is where the service recipient
pays the deferred amounts into a trust or escrow account either to secure
the service provider's right to future payment or to serve as the source of
the future payment.' 4 In either case, the service provider is insulated
9. For a full discussion of these doctrines as they relate specifically to deferred
compensation, see Brant J. Hellwig, Nonqualified Deferred Compensation and the Pre-
Statutory Limits on Deferral, in FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF RETIREMENT PLANS
13-19 to 13-34, 13-37 to 13-57 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2008).
10. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1979).
11. The amount paid in Year Ten would be the $100,000 of compensation
deferred plus a specified yield on that amount. The yield can be fixed or variable.
12. See Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-33 I.R.B. 16. While the law regarding initial
deferral elections is relatively clear, this is not the case for agreements to postpone
income beyond the original due date. Several cases have allowed taxpayers to ex-
tend original due dates without triggering constructive receipt as long as the deci-
sion to defer was made before the due date. See generally Comm'r v. Oates, 207
F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953) (holding that constructive receipt doctrine did not apply
where extension of original due date was requested as result of non-tax business
exigencies); Veit v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 809, 818 (1947) (holding that constructive
receipt doctrine did not apply where supplemental agreement to further defer
payments was "bona fide" and made at "arm's length"). The line of reasoning in
these cases has the potential to undermine basic principles behind the construc-
tive receipt doctrine because of the great flexibility it affords.
13. See Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 4, at 1116-25.
14. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174 (providing example of professional
football player who negotiates for signing bonus to be placed in escrow for subse-
quent distribution to him; ruled that player realized current economic benefit
when funds were contributed to escrow account).
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against the risk of the service recipient's insolvency.15 As a result, the eco-
nomic benefit doctrine applies.
In summary, to avoid current taxation, deferred compensation ar-
rangements historically had to provide for timely and irrevocable deferral
elections and ensure that service providers bore the risk of the service re-
cipient's insolvency during the deferral period. These conditions were rel-
atively easy to satisfy if the parties desired deferred taxation treatment.
C. The Tax Advantage of Deferred Compensation
Parties can be expected to negotiate for deferred compensation (as
compared to current compensation) when the tax benefits from deferred
compensation outweigh its non-tax costs. The costs are easy to see. First,
given the irrevocable nature of the deferral election, the service provider
loses the liquidity and flexibility that she would have if she instead had
received current compensation and directly invested the current compen-
sation for her own account.1 6 Second, deferred compensation arrange-
ments require the service provider to put her current compensation at the
risk of the service recipient's insolvency, which is often not a desirable
position for the service provider.1 7
Describing the tax benefit from deferred compensation is more com-
plicated. To evaluate the tax benefit, one must look at both sides of the
transaction. As several commentators have shown, any net benefit to the
parties generally stems from the difference in the tax rate that applies to
the investment yield during the deferral period.1 8 If the employee re-
ceives current compensation, then she invests that compensation for her
own account, and the investment yield is taxed at the employee's rate. If the
employee receives deferred compensation, then the employer invests the
compensation for the employee's account, and the investment yield is
taxed at the employer's rate. While the top marginal tax rates for individual
employees and corporate employers are both currently thirty-five per-
15. If, however, the assets of a trust are, by the trust's terms, available to the
service recipient's creditors, then there is no such insulation and the economic
benefit doctrine does not apply. Trusts with such terms are called "rabbi trusts."
See Yale & Polsky, supra note 4, at 576 n.16.
16. Instead, in a deferred compensation arrangement, she has effectively in-
vested her current compensation indirectly through her employer, with a resulting
loss of liquidity and flexibility during the deferral period.
17. This is not a desirable position because service providers make a large
investment of human capital in the employer resulting in suboptimal diversifica-
tion. See Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 877, 889 (2007). Deferred compensation arrangements
exacerbate this problem.
18. See Eric D. Chason, Executive Compensation and Tax Neutrality: Taxing the
Investment Component of Deferred Compensation, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 1667 (2010);
MICHAEL DORAN, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REFORM AND THE LIMIs OF TAX POLICY
(2004); Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money", 95
YALE L.J. 506 (1986); Yale & Polsky, supra note 4.
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cent,1 9 their effective tax rates on investments sometimes differ. A corpo-
ration may have net operating losses, which drive down its effective tax
rate on income recognized in the current year. Corporations are allowed
a dividends-received deduction,20 which drives its effective tax rate on divi-
dends below that of the fifteen percent tax rate currently enjoyed by indi-
viduals. 2 ' Corporations also pay no tax on the gains from the sale of their
own shares, 22 while individuals pay a fifteen percent tax rate on those
gains.
Thus, deferred compensation is tax-advantaged if the employer's in-
vestment tax rate is lower than the employee's investment tax rate. In all
other cases, the taxation of deferred compensation is the same as that of
current compensation or else deferred compensation is tax-disadvantaged.
Given the non-tax costs of deferred compensation described above, one
would expect to see deferred compensation only when it is tax-
advantaged.2 3
Several commentators have explored ways to neutralize the tax treat-
ment of current and deferred compensation. The tax laws could be
changed to impose the accrual method on employees who have rights to
deferred compensation. 24 Alternatively, a proxy tax could be imposed on
the employer's investment income attributable to compensation that is de-
ferred.2 5 This proxy tax would approximate the tax that would have been
imposed on the employee had she received current compensation and
then invested the compensation for her own account. Each of the two
methods-accrual taxation or a proxy tax-would in theory neutralize the
tax consequences between current and deferred compensation. However,
neutralization would be somewhat complex. While simplifying assump-
tions and exceptions (particularly for defined benefit plans) would be nec-
essary to make either method administratively feasible, these nods to
administrability would make the proposals not perfectly neutral in prac-
19. Compare I.R.C. § 1 (2012) (providing tax rates for individuals), with I.R.C.§ 11 (2012) (providing rates for corporations).
20. See I.R.C. § 243 (2012).
21. See id. § 1(h) (11).
22. See id. § 1032.
23. However, it is possible that in some cases cognitive error may cause trans-
acting parties to have a tax preference for deferred compensation even in situa-
tions where deferred compensation is not tax advantaged or may in fact be tax
disadvantaged, based on the intuition that paying tax later is always better than
paying tax earlier. Cf Gregg D. Polsky, High Volatility, Negative Correlation, and Roth
Conversions, 130 TAX NoT'Es 821, 821 (2011) (suggesting that taxpayers may irra-
tionally choose not to make Roth conversions based on intuitive preference for
paying tax later rather than earlier, even though Roth conversions are often
wealth-maximizing).
24. See, e.g., DoRAN, supra note 18. Sections 457(f) and 457A impose accrual
method taxation on certain nonqualified deferred plans set up by tax-indifferent
service recipients, like tax-exempt organizations or foreign taxpayers.
25. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 18. For a comparison between the accrual
tax and proxy tax approaches, see Yale & Polsky, supra note 4, at 592-99.
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tice. Nevertheless, the proposals would go a long way towards reducing
the tax advantage of deferred compensation but they would introduce ad-
ditional complexity into the tax system.
D. The Perceived Enron Abuses
Despite the potential tax advantage of deferred compensation and its
easy availability, no legislative proposals to fundamentally change the tax
treatment of deferred compensation were seriously considered until the
Joint Committee of Taxation's investigation into the collapse of Enron.2 6
That investigation uncovered a number of tactics that Enron employed to
allow its executives to receive the tax advantage of deferred compensation
while substantially mitigating the associated nontax costs.2 7 Recall that
the nontax costs of deferred compensation are (i) the inflexibility that
stems from irrevocable deferral decisions, and (ii) the subjecting of the
deferred compensation to the risk of employer insolvency.
Enron sought to mitigate these costs in two ways. First, Enron allowed
its executives to take early distributions at their election so long as they
took a ten percent forfeiture or "haircut." These arrangements arguably
avoided the constructive receipt doctrine because, while funds could be
received at any time, the ten percent haircut was thought to constitute a
substantial restriction or limitation on early distributions. Second, Enron
allowed its executives to make subsequent deferral elections that extended
payouts beyond their original distribution date as long as they made the
elections sufficiently in advance of these dates. Various court cases had
held that subsequent deferrals could be made without triggering construc-
tive receipt,2 8 and Enron's subsequent deferral arrangements were argua-
bly sanctioned by these cases, though the IRS might have disagreed.
Accelerated distributions and subsequent deferrals reduced the non-
tax costs from deferring compensation. Both added flexibility. Acceler-
ated distributions allowed participants to withdraw money whenever they
wanted (subject of course to the ten percent haircut), while subsequent
deferrals allowed participants to extend the initial deferral period. Accel-
26. See Trier, supra note 1, at 165 (noting that enactment of section 409A was
most significant development in taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation
in past twenty-five years). There has been some legislative tinkering around the
edges with regard to nonqualified deferred compensation plans of tax-indifferent
service recipients. In 1978, Congress enacted section 457, which imposed accrual
taxation on certain deferred compensation plans of state and local governments,
and in 1986, extended section 457 to apply to certain plans of other tax-exempt
service recipients. In addition, shortly after section 409A was enacted, Congress
passed section 457A, which imposes accrual taxation on nonqualified deferred
compensation arrangements of certain foreign employers.
27. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGA-
TION OF ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND
COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLIcy RECOMMENDATIONS 40 (Comm. Print 2003).
28. For a further discussion of cases that address the triggering of constructive
receipt, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
6412012]
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erated distributions also reduced the risk of insolvency because partici-
pants could accelerate distributions if the service recipient's financial
prospects appeared dim. Instead of going down with the ship, participants
could bail out early and forfeit only ten percent of their account balance.
The accelerated distribution provisions seemed particularly egregious
in the context of the Enron collapse. The Joint Committee investigation
had found that $53 million had been distributed to Enron insiders within
the two months preceding bankruptcy. Under bankruptcy law, however,
these accelerated distributions were preferences that could be recouped
for the benefit of all creditors. And, in fact, these accelerated distributions
were attacked as preferences by Enron's bankruptcy estate.2 9 Thus, while
it might have initially appeared that the deferred compensation partici-
pants could bail out early and get ninety cents on the dollar, they ended
up being treated like all other unsecured creditors.
It is thus very ironic that Enron became the poster child of nonquali-
fled deferred compensation abuse. In hindsight, the deferred compensa-
tion participants (and certainly all of those who took accelerated
distributions on the eve of bankruptcy) would have been far better off had
they initially elected to receive current compensation.so In other words,
Enron's deferred compensation participants gambled-to get the tax ad-
vantage of deferred compensation-and lost badly.
Nevertheless, Enron became Exhibit A for the proposition that the
nonqualified deferred compensation rules were broken and stimulated
the supposed legislative solution of section 409A.
II. SUMMARY OF SECTION 409A
As the previous section described, the pre-409A conditions for achiev-
ing deferred taxation treatment for compensation were very easy to satisfy.
Participants had to make timely and irrevocable elections to defer, and
they had to subject their future payment rights to the risk of the service
recipient's insolvency. Section 409A tightened up these conditions, pro-
viding for extremely detailed rules regarding the timing of the deferral
election,3 ' permissible distribution dates and events,3 2 and the location of
assets that would be the source of future payments. 3 3 Any failure to satisfy
29. See Motion of the Official Employment-Related Issues Committee for an
Order, Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 1103(c) and 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
Expanding Scope and Mandate and Granting Standing and Authority to Com-
mence Certain Avoidance Actions on Behalf of Debtors' Estates, In re Enron Corp.,
No. 01-16034, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2003) (asserting preference claims to re-
cover $53 million in accelerated distributions from Enron's nonqualified deferred
compensation arrangements).
30. This assumes, of course, that these participants would have had the good
sense to not invest all or most of the current compensation in Enron stock.
31. See I.R.C. § 409A(a) (4) (2012).
32. See id. § 409A(a) (2)-(3).
33. See id. § 409A(b).
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these technical conditions resulted in immediate taxation (and corre-
sponding immediate deduction for the service recipient) and the imposi-
tion of an additional twenty percent income tax and interest charges.34
To be section 409A compliant, deferred compensation plans must re-
strict the timing of distributions to fixed dates or upon certain specified
events3 5 and cannot permit accelerated distributions (i.e, distributions
that occur before the designated date or payment event) .3 Distributions
may be made upon the service provider's separation from service, disabil-
ity, or death, or upon the occurrence of an unforeseeable emergency
(such as a medical emergency) or of a change of control of the service
recipient. Distributions may be made at a specified time or pursuant to a
fixed schedule. The purpose of the permissible distribution rules was to
ensure that, once compensation is deferred, it may not be easily accessed
by the service provider earlier than the normal distribution date or de-
ferred beyond that date. In other words, the permissible distribution rules
ensured that deferral elections were more or less irrevocable. Thus, a plan
like Enron's that allowed for early distributions at the election of the par-
ticipants with a ten percent haircut would not be compliant.
Section 409A also provides detailed rules for the timing of initial and
subsequent deferral elections.3 7 Again, the purpose of these rules is to
restrict the flexibility of participants in deferred compensation plans.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH SECTION 409A
A. Section 409A Did Not Solve the Deferred Compensation Tax Problem
It is still very easy to obtain the tax benefits from deferred compensa-
tion in those circumstances in which such benefits are available. Section
409A explicitly provides the roadmap to do so. To be sure, section 409A
does reduce the flexibility of plan participants. But in cases where de-
ferred compensation is tax-advantaged the reduced flexibility is often not
a significant impediment. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that
the response to section 409A among tax planners was to make deferred
compensation plans 409A compliant and not to do away with deferred
compensation plans. Thus, the result is that section 409A simply provided
more hoops to jump through to get the tax benefit of deferred compensa-
tion, and everyone is jumping through them rather than opting out.
The theoretically optimal solution would be to neutralize the taxation
of deferred compensation with that of current compensation. This would
remove any tax advantage, while leaving the parties free to construct the
deferred compensation arrangement that best suits their non-tax business
needs. As noted before, however, neutralization would be somewhat com-
plex-but at least that complexity would solve the tax problem. Section
34. See id. § 409A(a) (1) (B), (b) (5).
35. See id. § 409A(a) (2).
36. See id. § 409A(a) (3).
37. See id. § 409A(a) (4).
2012] 643
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409A introduces extraordinary complexity (as described below) without
solving the tax problem.
B. Section 409A Introduced an Immense Amount of Complexity
Despite not solving the basic tax problem, section 409A managed to
introduce a tremendous amount of complexity into the Code. Section
409A and its regulations provide extremely detailed rules outlining the
permissible distribution dates and events. 3 8 They define, with inordinate
specificity, "separation from service," "disability," "change in the owner-
ship or effective control of the corporation," "unforeseeable emergency,"
and "specified time or fixed schedule." There are also very complex rules
defining deferred compensation3 9 and outlining permissible initial and
subsequent deferral election procedures. 40
C. Being Section 409A Compliant Is Costly
After the enactment of section 409A, all deferred compensation plans
had to be reformed to comply with its technical conditions.4 1 And, given
the inordinate complexity of the rules, full compliance is not an easy task.
D. It Is Possible for Even Diligent Plan Drafters and Administrators
to Commit Technical Violations
Even diligent deferred compensation plan drafters and administra-
tors can accidentally commit technical "foot-fault" violations. The rules
are extremely intricate, complex, and lengthy. In addition, the subject
matter of most of the rules appears totally benign, which can cause people
to become lackadaisical in drafting or complying with them. For example,
the definitions of "separation from service" or "disability" seem benign, yet
failure to comply with section 409A's extremely precise definitions42 will
have disastrous tax consequences.
E. Section 409A's Federalization of Deferred Compensation Plans Can
Undermine Legitimate Non-Tax Business Goals
Section 409A also effectively federalized all deferred compensation
plans. The additional twenty percent income tax is so significant-relative
to the limited tax benefit of deferred compensation-that the only op-
tions are either to be 409A compliant or to not pay deferred compensa-
tion. Thus, after the enactment of section 409A, all deferred
compensation plans have effectively been designed by federal tax regula-
38. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3 (2007).
39. See generally id. § 1.409A-1.
40. See generally id. § 1.409A-2.
41. As noted above, plans could in theory instead be jettisoned in favor of
additional current compensation, but this seems not to have been the reaction by
tax planners.
42. See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(i) (2), (4) (2007).
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tors. This limits the flexibility of companies to design plans that best suit
their business objectives, even in cases where the tax advantage of de-
ferred compensation is minimal or non-existent.
For example, the section 409A regulations generally apply to non-
qualified stock options because the service recipient's income realization
occurs when the options are exercised, which can occur in taxable years
after the year of receipt of the option.43 However, the regulations exclude
from the definition of deferred compensation stock options that have an
exercise price at least equal to the value of the underlying stock at the time
of grant.44 Thus, the only stock options that are subject to section 409A
are "in-the-money" stock options or "indexed" options (options whose ex-
ercise price is indexed to a particular benchmark like the Dow Jones In-
dustrial Average). And because stock options may generally be exercised
at any time (i.e., exercise is not limited to the specified permissible distri-
bution dates or events), in-the-money or floating stock options per se vio-
late section 409A and trigger the additional twenty percent tax. As a
result, in-the-money or indexed stock options are never issued. Yet, as
David Walker has explained, there may be very good non-tax business rea-
sons to issuing in-the-money stock options,4 5 and many have advocated
indexed options as a more precise instrument with which to compensate
employees.46 The federalization of deferred compensation has neverthe-
less outlawed them.
F. The Scope of Section 409A Is So Expansive that It Captures Arrangements
that Are Not Tax-Motivated
Section 409A applies to any deferred compensation arrangements.
Many deferred compensation arrangements are obvious, such as salary or
bonus deferral plans. But other deferred compensation arrangements are
less obvious. For example, consider a small business owner who promises
to give a loyal employee a share of the sales proceeds if and when he even-
tually sells his business. This is a deferred compensation plan that violates
section 409A because the eventual payment date is not a permissible distri-
bution date or event.4 7 Or consider a schoolteacher who has the option to
receive her ten-month salary over twelve months. This would be a de-
ferred compensation arrangement that violates section 409A unless the
arrangement complies with the deferral election rules.
43. See id. § 1.409A-1 (b) (5) (i) (A).
44. See id.
45. See generally David I. Walker, The Non-Option: Understanding the Dearth of
Discounted Employee Stock Options, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1505 (2009).
46. See Polsky, supra note 17, at 921.
47. It is possible that the sale of the company is a condition that rises to the
level of a substantial risk of forfeiture, but this is by no means clear. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.409A-1 (d) (1) (2007). If it does, then the arrangement would not violate sec-
tion 409A.
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Subjecting "accidental deferred compensation" plans to section 409A
is problematic for two reasons. First, because these arrangements are not
typically thought of as deferred compensation plans, they are a trap for
the unwary. If a taxpayer wants to set up a formal deferred compensation
plan, she would go to a lawyer who would (hopefully) know about section
409A. But if the taxpayer simply wants to promise to pay a future bonus to
her employee, she might do that without legal advice or without consult-
ing a lawyer who is sufficiently aware of the details of section 409A. Sec-
ond, accidental deferred compensation arrangements are by definition
not tax-motivated. The parties do not consider the arrangement deferred
compensation, and it is not paid in lieu of current compensation. It is a
bona fide business arrangement that happens to fall within section 409A's
expansive definition of deferred compensation.
IV. FIXING SECTION 409A
The previous part described the major deficiencies of Section 409A.
Its beneficial effect-tightening up the conditions for deferred taxation-
is small relative to these problems. This part discusses options for re-
forming section 409A, starting with legislative reforms that would require
congressional action followed by regulatory changes that could be
adopted by the Treasury without congressional involvement.
A. Legislative Options
Congress has two main options in fixing section 409A. It could go for
full-fledged reform by attempting to neutralize the tax treatment of de-
ferred and current compensation. It could do this by imposing accrual
taxation on the service providers who receive deferred compensation or by
imposing a special tax on the service recipients who pay deferred compen-
sation. Once neutralized, there would be no need to distinguish between
"good" deferred compensation plans and "bad" ones and no need to pe-
nalize the bad ones. Conceptually, this is clearly the best approach; the
issue is whether the administrative burdens of neutralization are worth the
benefits.
Congress could instead decide to tighten the doctrines of constructive
receipt and economic benefit, which is what it attempted to do in enacting
section 409A, without imposing significant unnecessary costs. One option
would be to keep section 409A as it is, but limit its application to compen-
sation paid by public companies.4 8 Such a refocusing of section 409A
would make sense. Smaller businesses are far less likely to have substantial
48. At the same time, Congress should limit the application of section 409A to
compensation paid to employees or directors, as the current regulations largely
provide. However, the statutory basis for this approach under current section
409A is questionable, as section 409A seems to apply, by its terms, to all compensa-
tion regardless of employee or independent contractor status. If Congress amends
section 409A, it should codify the current regulation's approach of limiting its
scope to employee and director compensation.
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formal deferred compensation for a number of reasons.49 Smaller busi-
nesses are at the same time more likely to have "accidental" deferred com-
pensation plans that run into section 409A problems because they lack the
sophistication and controls of a large company. Further, the marginal
compliance burden of section 409A on public firms will be relatively small
because they have accounting, legal, and tax departments that already
must review deferred compensation arrangements. In addition, because
small businesses are often organized as flow-through tax entities, the effec-
tive marginal tax rates of employees and employers (i.e., the owners of
small businesses) are likely to be similar, thereby reducing the tax advan-
tage of deferred compensation. In short, refocusing section 409A on large
employers better targets the companies that award large amounts of de-
ferred compensation to exploit differing tax rates, while limiting the mar-
ginal section 409A compliance burden.
Congress should also remove the additional twenty percent income
tax on non-compliant deferred compensation plans. Accrual taxation of
"bad" deferred compensation plans is sufficient to take away any tax ad-
vantage from deferred compensation; the twenty percent additional taK is
nothing but overkill.
Legislative tweaking of section 409A, while a move in the right direc-
tion, is not ideal. Deferred compensation arrangements are too varied
and fluid for section 409A's unyielding and comprehensive technical
rules. On the other hand, the pre-409A standards of constructive receipt
and economic benefit are appropriately flexible. Accordingly, the best
legislative approach (absent fundamental deferred compensation reform)
would be for Congress to replace the comprehensive rules in section 409A
with an explicit grant of authority to the Treasury Department and the IRS
to issue rules and regulations to fulfill the purposes of the constructive
receipt and economic benefit doctrines by requiring an appropriate level
of irrevocability and inflexibility in deferred compensation arrangements.
This grant of authority would allow the tax administrators the flexibility to
devise new technical rules in problem areas or to simply leave in place the
broad common law standards. The flexibility would also allow the tax ad-
ministrators to choose whether to promulgate general prophylactic regula-
tions or fact-specific rulings (to, for example, deal with specific abusive
transactions that have been uncovered). Importantly, the failure to com-
ply with the new rules and regulations would not trigger the additional
twenty percent tax. Instead, it would result in immediate taxation (and,
depending on the circumstances, the general negligence or substantial
understatement penalties that apply to underreported income).
49. Here are a couple of reasons. Employees of small businesses may have
less faith than employees of public companies that the company will be around
long enough to satisfy their long-term promises. Small businesses are less likely to
have the sophistication and legal advice necessary to draft and implement deferred
compensation plans.
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I would recommend that, if given this grant of authority, the Treasury
promulgate prophylactic regulations governing the timing of initial defer-
ral elections and subsequent deferrals. These could look much like the
timing rules in section 409A as it currently exists (without the twenty per-
cent additional tax). The Treasury should also promulgate regulations
tightening up the economic benefit doctrine to ensure that assets in rabbi
trusts are both legally and practically available to creditors of the service
recipient in the event of insolvency. Instead of issuing detailed rules set-
ting forth permissible distribution dates and events, I would suggest leav-
ing the pre-409A constructive receipt standard in place. That standard-
that amounts cannot be made available to taxpayers without substantial
restriction or limitation-is generally sufficient. If the IRS wants to show
taxpayers how it interprets the "substantial restriction or limitation" stan-
dard, it could do so in Revenue Rulings. For instance, if a ten percent
haircut is believed to be a problem (recall that bankruptcy preference law
seemed to have taken care of much of the perceived Enron problem), the
IRS could issue a revenue ruling describing its view that a ten percent
haircut is not substantial enough to prevent the application of the con-
structive receipt doctrine.
B. Regulatory Options
Congress has not done very well in the executive compensation tax
arena.5 0 Sections 162(m) and 280G are consensus failures, and section
409A surely fits that mold. Given this history, it is unlikely that Congress
will take appropriate action with respect to section 409A. In the absence
of legislation, the Treasury and IRS have three options. They can apply
section 409A literally as written, disregarding the fact that it is awful policy.
The faithful servant approach is the one they have taken in drafting sec-
tion 409A guidance to date. The only benefit of that approach is that it
tees up quite nicely for Congress and everyone else how much of a mess
section 409A really is, which (optimistically) could stimulate Congress to
enact one of the legislative fixes described above.
Alternatively, the tax administrators could announce that they will not
enforce section 409A. The IRS could issue a notice announcing that it will
not enforce section 409A until further notice, while expecting never to
issue that further notice. Such an explicit contravention of statutory lan-
guage by the tax administrators is not unprecedented. In 1997, the Trea-
sury Department promulgated the check-the-box regulations allowing
non-corporate business entities to elect their classification. This allows
substantively identical entities to be classified differently, despite statutory
language that precludes such a result.5 1 Much more recently, the IRS is-
50. See generally Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation ofExecu-
tive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLAIR L. REv. 485 (2009).
51. See 1 WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS 1 3.08 at 3-102 (4th ed. 2007) (arguing that statutory language precludes
check-the-box regulations' elective regime); Susan Pace Hamill, A Casefor Eliminat-
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sued a series of notices contravening the explicit text of section 382, which
limits the availability of loss carry-forwards and built-in losses held by com-
panies that undergo a change in ownership.52
The taxpayer standing doctrine precludes legal challenges of counter-
textual agency interpretations as long as the interpretations are favorable
to the taxpayer. The taxpayer standing doctrine prevents anyone from
litigating anyone else's tax liability, on the ground that general taxpayer
status does not result in a cognizable injury for standing purposes. This
doctrine effectively allows the Treasury and the IRS to issue whatever gui-
dance they would like, regardless of what the relevant statute requires, so
long as the departure from the statute results in a benefit to the taxpayer.
If the departure is unfavorable to the taxpayer, then it would quickly be
challenged in court by an affected taxpayer.
Even though a policy of section 409A non-enforcement would be im-
mune from legal challenge, there are several potential problems with that
approach. There would be political risk in publicly disavowing a very re-
cently enacted statute that was stimulated by the Enron collapse. And, the
disavowal could be viewed by unsophisticated observers as a giveaway to
corporate executives, since they are the biggest beneficiaries of nonquali-
fied deferred compensation benefits. In addition, there is the potential
for serious whipsaw of the IRS. While the application of section 409A is
generally adverse to the taxpayer, this will not always be the case. Govern-
ment disavowal of section 409A would allow taxpayers to selectively apply
the provision whenever it suited them. Service recipients could assert the
application of section 409A to claim deductions earlier than they would
otherwise be allowed, and service providers could assert the application of
section 409A to claim income realization in years that have been closed by
the statute of limitations.
For example, consider a situation where an employee defers compen-
sation in Year One which is payable in Year Ten. If the deferral arrange-
ment is not section 409A compliant, then under the statute the
compensation is included in the employee's income (and deductible by
the employer) in Year One, rather than Year Ten when it is paid out. Ab-
sent section 409A enforcement, the income and deduction realization
would occur in Year Ten (assuming that the traditional constructive re-
ceipt and economic benefit doctrines are satisfied). But the employer
would argue that the statute entitles it to a deduction in Year One if that
deduction is more beneficial than waiting until Year Ten. Similarly, in
ing the Partnership Classification Regulations, 68 TAx NOTEs 335, 337 n.15 (1995);
Philip F. Postlewaite & John S. Pennell, JCT's Partnership Tax Proposals-'Houston,
We Have a Problem', 76 TAx NOTES 527, 532 (1997).
52. For a full discussion of these notices and how they were inconsistent with
section 382, see J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Can the Treasury Exempt its
Own Companies from Tax? The $45 Billion GM NOL Cartyfonoard, in 1 CATO PAPERS
ON PUBLIC POLICY (Jeffrey Miron ed. 2011), available at http://rasmusen.org/pa-
pers/gm-ramseyer-rasmusen.doc.
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Year Ten, the employee could argue that section 409A required income
inclusion in Year One (a year that is now closed by the statute of limita-
tions), which would reduce the income inclusion in Year Ten. In those
cases, the IRS would not be able to defend its position that section 409A
does not apply because the statute requires its application.
To mitigate the whipsaw problem, the IRS could put conditions on its
non-enforcement policy. The IRS could condition non-enforcement on
consistency with that approach by the employer and, going forward, by the
employee. It could do so by inviting taxpayers to check a box on their tax
returns waiving the right to claim section 409A treatment. Failure to
check the box would invite the IRS scrutiny to determine compliance with
section 409A.
Besides political and whipsaw concerns, there is another drawback of
an explicit non-enforcement policy. Such a policy would effectively leave
the pre-409A doctrines of constructive receipt and economic benefit in
place as they existed before section 409A was enacted, without any tighten-
ing up of the conditions for deferral. It would be awkward, to say the least,
for the Treasury and the IRS to tinker around the edges of these doctrines
while explicitly disregarding a statute designed to reinforce them.
A middle-ground approach, between literal interpretation and non-
enforcement, would be for the Treasury and the IRS to recognize that
section 409A is a legislative calamity when drafting guidance. Congress
explicitly gave the Treasury specific authority to "prescribe such regula-
tions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this
section [409A]." This specific delegation could be used to re-focus section
409A exclusively on the deferred compensation arrangements of ex-
tremely large employers, which were the types of arrangements that trig-
gered its enactment.
For example, the Treasury could interpret "compensation" for pur-
poses of section 409A to refer only to compensation earned by employees
of publicly traded entities. As discussed above, such a refocusing of sec-
tion 409A would make eminent sense for a number of reasons. One prob-
lem with this approach is that it is difficult to reconcile it with the statutory
language, though it is obviously more faithful to the statutory language
than a policy of non-enforcement. "Compensation" as used in the text of
section 409A is not limited in any way, while the suggested interpretation
limits the scope of compensation to that issued by public companies. But
because the suggested interpretation is a taxpayer-favorable interpreta-
tion, it usually would be protected by the taxpayer standing doctrine. In
addition, the current regulations effectively reinterpret "compensation" to
refer only to employee compensation, thereby exempting independent
contractor compensation from the scope of section 409A despite the ab-
sence of any statutory ground for making the distinction.5 3 Thus, the cur-
rent regulations reflect an awareness that the scope of section 409A is
53. See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(f) (2) (2007).
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overbroad, and they attempt to cabin its effect to arrangements that are
problematic. The suggested interpretation merely extends this massaging
of statutory text to the next logical place.
Whipsaw of the IRS would be a concern with this approach too. Non-
public employers and their employees could assert section 409A in those
cases where it suits them, while the IRS would be prevented from applying
the provision to these taxpayers. However, the check-the-box procedure
previously discussed could mitigate the whipsaw concern.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 409A is a failure. It fails to neutralize the tax treatment of
deferred compensation with that of current compensation. At the same
time, it imposes significant compliance costs on sophisticated taxpayers,
and it is a dangerous trap for unwary taxpayers. It applies to a host of
innocent transactions, while tax-advantaged deferred compensation plans
persist as long as the "i's" are dotted and the "t's" are crossed.
Ideally, Congress should repeal section 409A and replace it with a
system that taxes deferred compensation neutrally. Failing that, Congress
should either replace section 409A with a broad grant of authority to the
tax administrators to beef up the pre-409A constructive receipt and eco-
nomic benefit doctrines or amend section 409A to limit its scope to em-
ployee compensation paid by public companies.
If Congress fails to act, the tax administrators should interpret "com-
pensation" as used in section 409A to include only compensation paid by
public companies to their employees or directors. This counter-textual
interpretation of the statute creates the potential for whipsaw of the IRS by
non-public companies and their employees, but this problem is out-
weighed by the benefits derived from cleaning up section 409A.
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